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Service charge collection in multi-unit
developments
Adele McKeown1
Macfar Property Management, Ireland
Lorcan Sirr
Dublin Institute of Technology, Ireland

Introduction
Multi-unit developments (MUDs) – typically developments of
apartments, or apartments and houses, but also sometimes including a
commercial component – differ from traditional housing as they have
three distinct characteristics: individual ownership of a unit, shared
ownership of common property, and collective membership of a
corporate body that assumes responsibility for the management of the
development (Christudason, 2004). In the Irish case, this corporate
body is known as the owners’ management company (OMC). The
legal framework for ownership in MUDs is based on leasehold, which
means that the purchaser owns the property but not the land on which
it is built. Leaseholds in a MUD tend to have long leases, which can be
sold on to a new owner (National Consumer Agency, 2008). In order
to fund maintenance of upkeep of the common areas, the OMC levies
an annual service charge on owners of properties within the
development.
1 Adele McKeown holds a Masters in Real Estate from DIT, and in her current position
specialises in management companies, commercial and residential management, and
lettings.
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Currently, service charges are collected annually and if a property
owner refuses to pay, the debt collection process can be lengthy and
expensive. Naturally, debt collection for developments that are already
struggling can be particularly difficult. Service charges are subject to
the statute of limitations, meaning if the debt is not collected within six
years, it is statute-barred and effectively uncollectible, even upon sale
of the property. A vicious circle often then ensues: as non-payment of
service charges impacts on the maintenance and standard of the
development, some services will inevitably be reduced or withdrawn.
In turn, this can cause other property owners to stop paying their
service charges, leading to a further reduction in services, and so on.
This is a critical weakness in the Irish system.

The legislation – Companies Act and Multi-Unit
Developments Act
Most OMCs in Ireland are companies limited by guarantee not having
a share capital. These companies are governed by the Companies Act,
2014, which consolidates previous legislation on companies. The
Multi-Unit Developments Act (MUD Act), 2011, applies to MUDs,
defined as land on which buildings have been erected, comprising no
fewer than five residential units, in which it is intended amenities,
facilities and services are to be shared. In addition to applying to the
concept of traditional apartment developments, Section 2 of the Act
expands the application of the Act to residential housing
developments where there is a management company structure and
also to mixed-use developments comprising commercial and
residential units to the extent that amenities, facilities and services are
shared by the commercial and residential units. Issues arising since the
implementation of this Act in 2012 are the lack of awareness and
understanding among members and the lack of sanctions against
developers, directors and members who do not comply with the Act.
The ownership structure of MUDs means that corporate governance
within these structures can be difficult to manage and there is a lack of
transparency in the context of managing apartment buildings
(Paulsson, 2007).
The MUD Act was primarily aimed at apartment schemes and the
apartment content in mixed-use developments, but also included
conventional housing where a service charge scheme is being operated
in relation to estate common areas. As all owners share, use and own
the common areas – for example, halls, gardens and parking – with
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other units, MUDs are owned and maintained by the unit owners on a
communal basis. They pay an annual fee known as a service charge for
the maintenance of these common areas. These common areas are
then owned by an OMC, which is a not-for-profit company limited by
guarantee and established to be the registered owners of the common
areas within a development. OMCs are owned and controlled by the
individual apartment owners. They frequently employ an agent to
manage the development on their behalf and appoint a board of
directors from among them to instruct the agent (Gogan, 2008). As an
OMC member, each owner is required to pay a service charge which
funds the running of the OMC (e.g. to pay the managing agent);
however, if the service charges are not paid, the OMC typically gets
into difficulty as it has limited funds to carry out repairs and
maintenance or even to pay the managing agent (Bailey & Robertson,
1997). The theory behind the operation of an OMC makes sense when
and where all owners work together to ensure the development is
maintained to a high standard. Flaws appear when cooperation fails
and legal obligations are ignored, made worse by limited scope to
recover unpaid charges.

Collection of service charges
All individual owners of properties within the development are
shareholders of their OMC, effectively owning the management
company, which in turn owns all of the common areas. At the OMC’s
annual general meeting (AGM) the members appoint directors by
vote and, in accordance with the provisions of the MUD Act, each
property owner has one vote. At the AGM, a property manager (or
‘managing agent’) may be appointed to manage the day-to-day
maintenance and upkeep of the development on behalf of the OMC.
Although it is up to the OMC to set the level of service charges to be
levied annually on each property in the development, the MUD Act
recommends a minimum annual charge of €200. This is quite low
given that the service charge should be based on estimates of running
costs, both short- and long-term. The obligation on unit owners to pay
service charges and the entitlement of management companies to
collect them arise from the covenants and obligations which both
OMCs and multi-unit property owners enter into in the conveyancing
documents by which they purchase their properties (Office of the
Director of Corporate Enforcement, 2008). This is in addition to the
general obligations that apply to all OMCs as set out in the MUD Act.
Service charges generate the cash flow that an OMC needs to provide
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services and maintain a development (Competition and Consumer
Protection Commission, 2017). Depending on the development,
service charges pay for:
• repair and maintenance of common areas, car parks, footpaths,
roads;
• cleaning common areas, windows, carpets/mats, gutters and drains;
• lift repairs and inspections;
• electricity and lighting for common areas;
• landscaping and gardening, pest control;
• security – internal locks and doors, intercoms, external doors and
gates;
• safety – smoke alarms, fire extinguishers, health and safety
inspections;
• refuse collection and recycling;
• professional charges (for example, block/building insurance, public
liability insurance, the OMC’s legal/auditor fees).
It is important that members understand the fundamentals of what
they agreed to when buying their property. Gogan (2008) has pointed
out the importance of having a clear service charge collection policy to
ensure that the members of the OMC are aware of the process and the
implications of non-payment, but it is unclear to what extent clear
policies exist. The OMC is solely reliant on service charges to function,
but there are also major concerns surrounding the lack of transparency of the composition of service charges. Service charges in
Ireland are calculated in line with the head lease, which is the original
lease document that the developer’s solicitor draws up for each
property and is the lease signed by the first purchaser. The head lease
outlines how service charges should be calculated, what interest
should apply and when they should be paid. These calculations vary
from development to development, with some calculated on a ‘per
square footage’ basis, others having an equal amount for all units, and
others calculated on a percentage basis. However, it is evident that
there is no standard means by which service charges are levied.
Service charge administration, collection and increasing levels of
debt (where owners have not paid their service charges) are a major
challenge for OMCs. Members of the OMC often need a physical
manifestation of what they are getting for their service charge through
visual improvements to the development. This means they do not
always acknowledge the cost of accounts, insurance and agents’ fees as
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valuable, although these are necessary expenditure items (Fakhrudin
et al., 2011). To make matters even more challenging, a service charge
may be low for the first year of a resident’s occupation as little
maintenance is required but then may escalate rapidly much to the
surprise of the new owner (Sirr, 2010). Research by the Society of
Chartered Surveyors Ireland (2014) indicates that the majority of
OMCs increase their service charge budget annually. However, rapid
increases are more likely depending on the age of the buildings and
the likely amount of strategic maintenance and repair they may need
(e.g. lifts that may need substantial repair or replacing every twenty
years). This can lead to a belief that service charges are sometimes
‘unfair’ or ‘disproportionate’, and can lead to non-payment by unit
owners. As a result, property management companies often lack the
funds required to enable them to run the development effectively
(Lujanen, 2010).
Predictably enough, non-payment of service charges will inevitably
lead to the deterioration and dilapidation of a development. Our
analysis of fifty OMC company accounts and a series of stakeholder
interviews shows there appears to be a significant problem with
individual members refusing to pay their service charges. A lack of
funds in the OMC in turn often means these debtors are not pursued.
The net effect of not pursuing those who owe service charge money is,
for those unit owners who are paying, an increase in service charges to
pursue the non-payers through legal mechanisms. This is not only
costly but it can take up to five years to recover the debt; threats of
suing and forfeiture of leases for non-payment are expensive for the
OMC to enforce and usually result in payment of the service charges
owed the day before a case appears before a court, resulting in
expensive and non-recoverable legal fees.
Stopping the payment of service charges is a breach of contractual
obligations under the terms of the lease under which the property was
bought. As such, if an owner does not pay their management fees, they
may be liable to legal action and any outstanding debts can be tied to
the unit. If the management company does not collect charges, it will
run short of money and in time it may not be able to provide even the
most basic services. This leads to residents withholding their service
charge payment in protest as they are unhappy with the service
provided (Sirr, 2010). Property managing agents often threaten to
remove non-payers from the block insurance, deny parking permits or
bin store access, or add interest to their accounts. The lease generally
provides for the addition of interest to a service charge account and it
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can be an effective way of encouraging payment. Non-paying members
may lose their right to vote at the AGM, therefore having no control
over the future expenditure of the management companies.
Therefore, although members may withhold payment in protest, the
net effect is that it dilutes their ability to effect change within their
OMC (Sirr, 2010). Whether they understand or appreciate this is
another matter.

The sinking fund
The MUD Act introduced a requirement for all OMCs to establish
and maintain a sinking fund. The sinking fund is a savings pot for
capital expenditure within the development such as major structural
repairs, refurbishment and redecoration, replacement of expensive
equipment (e.g. a lift), or advice from a qualified person in relation to
these types of work. In effect, it is like a pension fund for a
development (Gogan, 2008). Crucially, the sinking fund is part of the
service charge. The sinking fund contribution should really be a
separate line item on the service charge invoice but generally it is not
treated as such. It is paid with the service charges by the members of
the OMC and then transferred into a separate bank account at a later
date. It is usually intended that a sinking fund will be set up and
collected over the whole life of the wasting asset (RICS, 2014).
There are two main ways to capitalise a sinking fund: the first is a
cash contribution from the owners, usually via the annual service
charge. This can occasionally be supplemented by the raising of a
large, one-off contribution from unit owners (OMC members) at the
time the common property capital expenditure is to be made; this is
widely referred to as a ‘special levy’ (Arkcoll et al., 2013). Although a
once-off levy may seem like a simple solution to any once-off funding
requirement, there is always uncertainty over whether owners have the
ability or willingness to pay such a levy. At the Beacon South Quarter
development in Dublin in 2017 the OMC passed a motion to call on a
once-off levy to members for €10,000 each to cover the cost of an
expected €10 million bill for safety works and repairs to a wateringress situation.
The second option for financing sinking funds is through loan
finance from financial markets or from public authorities. This ‘debt
financing’ refers to the OMC taking up a loan to cover the costs of
repairs or other one-off expenditure. The problem with loan financing
is that common property does not lend itself to use as loan collateral,
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as it is not normally possible to separate it from privately owned units
(Arkcoll et al., 2013). It may be possible for individual unit owners to
pledge their property as collateral, but as Lujanen (2010, p180) points
out, ‘It is understandable that not all owners are willing to pledge their
dwellings for loans as collateral for certain types of major repair
activity.’ In the Irish context, all unit owners would be required to
pledge their property as collateral, and many of those units would have
existing borrowings already secured, so this would make it difficult to
secure funding from the usual banking sources (Malone, 2017). It is
interesting to note that the Finnish housing model is set up as a limited
company and each member has a share certificate that corresponds to
right of possession of a unit. A simple majority is all that is required by
the OMC to make the decision to borrow funds by the limited
company that is the OMC. If a member fails to pay their share of the
loan or other charges, the OMC can take possession of the unit in
question for up to three years and use the rent received to clear
outstanding debts. In Austria a privileged lien exists, meaning that a
loan taken by the OMC bypasses the priority ranking of loans taken by
individual unit owners (Lujanen, 2010).
The MUD Act determined that the sinking fund contribution from
the service charge should be €200 per member per annum or an
amount otherwise agreed at an AGM, meaning that OMC members
may vote to increase or reduce that sum as they see fit. Ideally,
contributions to the sinking fund should be ring-fenced and
immediately paid into the sinking fund when payment is made. In the
context of most MUDs, €200 is a very small sum per housing unit
given the capital-intensive nature of elements such as replacing a lift
or repairing a roof. The fact that this sum can be further reduced by a
vote at the OMC’s AGM weakens the effectiveness of the legislative
requirement even more. Research by Malone (2017) has shown that
sinking funds are regularly used for ongoing, day-to-day, rather than
strategic, expenditure, which is not their aim. This rate of expenditure
varies from 5 to 30 per cent of the sinking fund per annum.
The existence and financial health of a sinking fund is something
frequently overlooked when purchasing multi-unit property, yet so
many years after the introduction of the MUD Act, our analysis shows
that less than 60 per cent of OMCs have sinking funds in place, with
up to 48 per cent of sinking funds having no monies with which to carry
out maintenance. The absence, or inadequate funding, of a sinking
fund has many implications for current developments (upkeep,
structural integrity, value of individual properties) but also for future
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initiatives. For example, sprinkler systems are not generally used in
residential developments in Ireland. However, in 2017 several local
authorities permitted sprinkler systems to be fitted in new build-torent residential developments. These systems require considerable
maintenance, and should these units ever be sold to private
individuals, there are obvious issues around the ability of OMCs to
carry out such important upkeep given the typical underfunded state
of many sinking funds. At that stage, people’s lives may be at risk.

Options for collection of outstanding service charges
Typically, those who do not pay the required service charges (debtors)
generally fall into three categories: i) those who dispute that the
amount is due at all; ii) those who admit they owe the money but just
will not pay; and iii) those who admit they owe the money but simply
do not have the means to pay (Bowe O’Brien Solicitors, 2009). For the
collection of outstanding service charge debt, the OMC can choose to
wait until the property is sold; at this point the service charges are
easily collected as the vendor needs the agent to complete ‘the MUD
Act pre-contract enquiries’ along with supporting documentation. In
effect, a sale cannot be completed without this and therefore the OMC
directors will instruct the agent not to release the documentation until
service charges have been paid in full or an undertaking is received. If
the property is not sold and the debt is accumulating year-on-year, the
directors together with the managing agent will often have to make the
decision to pursue legal action against non-paying members. Where a
sum of less than €6,348 is due, it can go before the District Court as
an ordinary contract debt. The solicitor will issue and serve a civil
summons claiming the debt on the member. If the District Court is
satisfied to enter judgment then the OMC will get a signed decree
from the District Court (Courts Service, 2014). Once the court
proceedings have been issued, the next stage of the process is
enforcing the judgment against the debtor by sending the judgment to
the Sheriff’s Office for collection of money or goods to the value of the
debt. The judgment can be registered as a charge over the debtor’s
property without the consent of the debtor. If there are other charges
already registered such as a mortgage or other judgments registered
before the service charges, the service charges judgment lines up
behind them (Mason, Hayes & Curran, 2016).
Other jurisdictions have adopted different options to recover
unpaid service charges. According to Malone (2017), in Canada and in
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some states of the US, OMCs can take a lien against a property should
an owner default on sinking fund or service charge payments. In
Sweden, where individual owners have not paid their share of the
capital costs or in cases where they have not fulfilled other obligations
(such as paying management fees), the managing board of the owners’
association has a duty to engage in recovery proceedings and has the
legal power to initiate a foreclosure procedure against individual unit
owners without a court decision. In Germany and Hungary, OMCs
have the right of compulsory sale without consent of individual owners
when the owners have not fulfilled their obligations (Lujanen, 2010).

Statute of limitations
Claims for service charges are subject to a statutory limitation period
of six years from the date the sums are properly due under the terms
of the lease. The exception to this is if the leaseholder has
acknowledged the debt within the limitation period; for example,
where a demand for payment is sent out to which the leaseholder
confirms there is an outstanding amount or balance due. The
limitation period will then run from the date of the last
acknowledgement. Within eighteen months of incurring a cost that is
intended to be recovered through the service charge, the OMC must
either demand the payment in the prescribed method or the member
must be informed that these costs have been incurred and
reimbursement will be sought at some time in the future (Statute of
Limitations, 1957).
Several issues are becoming increasingly evident concerning the
service charge under the MUD Act. The most obvious of these are:
• Is the service charge collection process working?
• To what extent are OMCs at risk of insolvency?
• What are the governance and legal issues connected with service
charges?
Our analysis provided the following results to those questions.

Is the service charge collection process working?
It would appear that the service charge collection process is failing.
Reasons cited by owners for not paying their service charges included
personal economic factors, a general unwillingness to pay and the ‘free
rider’ theory – people feel that they can get away with not paying if
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everyone else is subsidising them. In addition, non-payers seem well
aware that services in a MUD are not easily withdrawn. The
information deficit and lack of understanding of the need for, and role
of, service charges are also an issue. This is a very interesting point as
when we surveyed OMC members, some 68 per cent of house owners
surveyed were aware when they purchased their property that they
would have to pay service charges annually, while 85 per cent of
apartment owners were aware (see Figure 1). This would indicate that
there is an information deficit among house-owning ‘OMC members’,
if not among all owners. This point was further enforced when the
survey results were filtered to ascertain why members were not happy
to pay service charges: 85 per cent of them were not familiar with the
MUD Act and 50 per cent of them did not know why they must pay
service charges at all.
There is ‘a vicious circle’ with the non-payment of service charges
in some developments: when owners do not see visual manifestations
of value for money, they stop paying, and when they stop paying,
services are reduced, leading more owners to stop paying, and so on.
When this happens, there is obviously a risk that the management
company will not be able to operate and may become insolvent. In our
analysis, owners of houses in OMCs rated grass-cutting and cleanliness
as being the most important expense items (well above the
requirement to have a sinking fund); apartment owners rated
insurance the most important.
Our findings also showed that investors are less likely than owneroccupiers to pay service charges. Interestingly, house owners were also
identified as a specific problem group, with findings showing that
house owners, as opposed to apartment owners, are less likely to pay:
a lack of understanding of the function of a service charge was
identified as the reason for non-payment. This has been confirmed by
our survey of OMC members. Only 55 per cent of house owneroccupiers were happy to pay service charges compared to 80 per cent
of the apartment owners surveyed who were owner-occupiers and
were happy to pay their service charges. Of the investors surveyed, 83
per cent owned apartments or duplexes, and 80 per cent of these
understood that they would have to pay service charges annually when
they purchased their property; however, 43 per cent of investors did
not think their service charges were good value.
Our analysis also showed that the majority of property agents and
OMC directors are erroneously of the view that the statute of
limitations does not apply to service charge arrears and that, as the
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Figure 1: Apartment owners versus house owners

debt is collectable when the property is sold, there is no need to
provide for that bad debt. Interestingly, accountants we spoke to
stated that the developments with which they work have a provision
for bad debts, with some indicating that any interest added should be
provided for in a bad debts provision as it is not necessarily as
collectable as service charge income. Bad debts are not written off in
the OMC accounts, although it was also indicated that the interest on
bad debts can be written off occasionally. Some agents were of the
erroneous opinion that to write off bad debts would actually be a
breach of title. If bad debts are not provided for, the debtors’ figure
will naturally increase year on year.
OMC directors interviewed suggested that communication and
flexibility of payment might be the key to getting members to pay.
There were mixed views around using discounting as an incentive to
encourage payment; however, all interviewees agreed that adding
interest to service charges, withdrawal of services and legal action were
proven methods of encouraging payment. Prompt action against nonpayers was also stressed as being key to ensuring timely payment.
Among those surveyed, 75 per cent of house owners and 70 per cent
of apartment owners claimed that they paid their service charges on
time annually. One respondent commented that they ‘wish that they
chased up the debtors in a more productive way. There always seems
to be a shortfall in the sinking fund and they mention the amount of
debtors each year. I think they should be prosecuted!’
Our analysis yielded an interesting finding relating to the level at
which service charges are set and the impact that this could have on
property owners’ willingness to pay: when paying an annual service
charge of more than €1,500 per annum, 70 per cent of apartment
owners indicated that they did not think it was good value, with 50 per
cent not paying the charge on time. However, when paying between
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€500 and €1,000, 82 per cent of apartment owners thought it was
good value and 90 per cent claimed to pay on time.

To what extent are OMCs at risk of insolvency?
From an analysis of the accounts of fifty OMCs, it can be seen that
most companies have a high debtors’ figure, which is representative of
outstanding service charges. When measured as a percentage of the
budgeted income for a development in a given year, it allows a
comparison between OMCs in terms of service charge arrears. This
comparison highlights that the problem is common to most
management companies, albeit to varying degrees (see Figure 2). Less
than one in five of the management companies examined had a
debtors’ level representing less than 10 per cent of their annual
budget; a further 52 per cent had a debtors’ level between 11 per cent
and 50 per cent of their budget. In itself this might not be of concern,
but when combined with the fact that 54 per cent of the companies
profiled had increased their debtors’ level from the previous financial
period, the concern would be that the levels would continue to
increase, pushing those companies to have a higher debtors’ level
every year. Nearly 20 per cent of the accounts analysed showed a
debtors’ level between 51 per cent and 100 per cent. Finally, 12 per
cent of accounts recorded a debtors’ level in excess of the total income
needed to run a development for one financial year. Interviews with
OMC directors revealed that the debtors frequently comprise a
concentrated group of individuals who have not paid for years.
Accountants highlighted the risks of their services being withdrawn,
with one accountant explaining that if the accounts are not paid for,
they will not be filed, and if they are not filed, the company will be
struck off and no one in the development will be able to sell their
property.
Our analysis of company accounts indicated that between 60 per
cent and 90 per cent of debtors are paying in full each year, which is in
line with the OMC members’ survey, where 70 per cent of overall
respondents claimed to pay on time annually. There was a mixed
response when asked if the amounts owed by debtors were greater
than the budget. One agent pointed out that 20 per cent of the
members owed 80 per cent of the debt and therefore debtors’ levels
being greater than the budget will not necessarily impact the
development.
From the accounting analysis, it can be deduced that some OMCs
have not complied with the MUD Act and do not have a separate
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Figure 2: Debtors’ level as a percentage of budget

sinking fund established as of yet, some seven years after the Act was
introduced. An alternative explanation may be that the accountant
preparing their books and records has not included any reference to
the sinking fund, perhaps because they are not familiar with the MUD
Act.

What are the governance and legal issues connected with service
charges?
A range of governance and legal issues affect OMCs in Ireland. The
statute of limitations is easily identified as negatively affecting OMCs,
with agents citing cases where their OMCs lost tens of thousands of
euro in service charges due to the statute of limitations. Although
most agents and directors took the view that the debt stays with the
property, it is evident from court cases that if it goes to court, the judge
will not necessarily agree. Service charges are unique as they are the
only non-government charge that is excludable from insolvency
arrangements so they remain payable even in insolvency. The logic is
that a purchaser would not buy a property without service charges
being cleared and so will insist on clear unencumbered title. Therefore, an OMC’s only bargaining power is when a member is selling
their property and needs the agent to complete the MUD Act precontract enquiries in order to close the sale; however, that does not
help if an owner is not paying their service charges and intends to live
in a property indefinitely.
On the issue of legal action, it was observed that ‘a judgment won’t
turn into cash,’ which is a relevant point: it can be very difficult to
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obtain a judgment, let alone enforce it, particularly for a small OMC
run on a not-for-profit basis.

Conclusions
It is clear from our analysis and interviews that debtors’ levels are a
growing problem within OMCs. There is poor financial planning and
deficient sinking fund reserves within MUDs in Ireland. This
ineffective financial planning arises through poor training and
education of OMC members and directors, and the difficult position
of managing agents who are not permitted to increase service charges
despite advising the OMC otherwise (Malone, 2017), thereby leading
to further financial deterioration within the development. Analysis of
the accounts clearly highlights the urgency of this issue: 30 per cent of
the accounts analysed recorded debtors’ levels that are greater than 50
per cent of their annual budget. When interviewed, the agents, OMC
directors and accountants verified that this problem stems from a
small percentage of debtors not paying over a long period of time,
which means that the other owners effectively must subsidise the nonpayers. Although this may clarify the source of non-payers, it does not
dilute the effect of the debtors’ level increasing year on year – the
company will eventually become insolvent. It is also worrying that
seven years after the introduction of the MUD Act so few OMCs have
sinking funds in place.
The implications of non-payment of service charges, and the
absence of a sinking fund, are therefore of increasing importance for
a couple of reasons:
i.
ii.

The housing policy drive towards greater numbers of households
living in apartments will mean more MUDs in the country.
The ageing stock and legacy defects issues of current MUDs mean
that in the next decade a considerable amount of remediation,
replacement and strategic repair will become necessary. This will
require significant sums of money which currently appear to be
absent. Many OMCs are therefore at risk of a shortfall in funds for
major capital expenditure which will be needed over the coming
ten to twenty years. This shortfall will then have to be borne by the
OMCs’ membership in the form of a levy or grossly increased
service charges. OMCs seem generally unaware that this situation
is possible or likely.
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There are a couple of issues to be addressed to mitigate the risk of
OMC insolvency and which may act as potential solutions:
i.

There is no uniform approach to the way accounts for OMCs are
prepared. It appears there are some highly diligent auditors who
have prepared the accounts, including references to common area
transfer and fire safety, highlighting the risks associated with bad
debts and recording the sinking fund as a separate line item on the
balance sheet; others do not reference any of the above – even to
say that they are not in place. With the Companies Act, 2017,
negating the requirement for OMCs’ accounts to be audited, it is
going to be more difficult to adopt a uniform approach. There is
also the issue of bad debts: some agents and directors of OMCs
have a provision, while others do not, but none of them write off
bad debts. It would appear, therefore, that:
• Accountants should identify and address whether there is a
sinking fund in place.
• Debtors’ levels should be highlighted in the accounts, and
broken down to show how many debtors owe the amount
outstanding and how many years it relates to.
• A bad debts provision should be included for any debts
approaching the statute of limitations if legal action is not being
pursued.

ii.

It is also evident that the legislation impacting OMCs needs to be
examined, primarily:
• The statute of limitations – should this be applicable to OMCs
or does the debt stay with the property? If the debtor has
acknowledged that the sum is outstanding, then it should be
collectable in full as the other members have paid theirs and
the non-paying member has benefited from the services;
however, our analysis has shown that, in practice, the six-year
rule applies and this needs to be examined further.
• The MUD Act – it is clear from the research that there is a lack
of knowledge and understanding among members of management companies. This was highlighted by all stakeholders
interviewed and surveyed and was further emphasised by the
low levels of familiarity with the MUD Act. Agents and
directors have very little faith in the Act as it does not have any
repercussions for non-compliance.
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• Government intervention may be required if there is a risk that
a number of OMCs could become insolvent over the next few
years.

Recommendations
Given the issues with service charges – from calculation to collection –
it is evident that the MUD Act needs urgent review. This is
particularly pertinent and necessary given the government’s drive
towards the construction of more MUDs, mostly in apartment form, in
the future. The construction, sale and occupation of these types of
developments are taking up a lot of policy consideration but the
ongoing running, maintenance and management have been sorely
neglected. We make the following recommendations for further
consideration:
i.

A statutory body (e.g. the Residential Tenancies Board (RTB))
could be charged with taking responsibility for OMCs in Ireland.
They should keep a database of all OMCs and provide dispute
resolution services between OMCs and members. They should
also keep a database of OMCs, which can be filtered against their
existing database of rented properties in Ireland to provide the
OMCs with information on which properties are investor-owned
within a development.
ii. Fast-track courts system: the statute of limitations of six years is
having an impact on the collection of service charges. A fast-track
court system similar to the small claims court should be
established to enable OMCs to collect amounts due or obtain a
judgment. The practice in Finland should be considered, whereby
management companies are given powers to take possession of
the unit in question for a maximum of three years and pay the
unpaid amount using revenue earned from rent.
iii. Standardised accounts preparation for OMCs: all OMCs should
be required to prepare and file their annual accounts in the same
format, making specific reference to the sinking fund and
analysing debtors in more detail. There should also be clear
guidance as to whether OMCs should provide for bad debts
and/or write off bad debts.
iv. The Data Protection Act, 1988, prohibits an OMC from disclosing
the personal data of the members without their consent, unless
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such disclosure is explicitly provided for in the memorandum and
articles of association of the company as a condition of
membership. OMCs should include this provision in their new
company constitution to enable them to publish the unit number
and amounts owing of all properties in the non-statutory part of
their accounts. The exclusion of this information is inequitable as
the common areas are owned equally by all members and there
should be complete transparency for all unit owners.
v. OMCs need increased participation from members. In order for
this to happen, members must be better educated when they are
purchasing their property.
vi. Enforcement of the MUD Act regarding the obligation to pay
service charges, with penalties for failing to do so and a mandate
to withdraw services from non-payers.
vii. It could be beneficial for the Office of the Revenue
Commissioners to introduce a form of tax relief for those
individuals paying service charges, as it appears to be unfair that
those living in properties that are located in a MUD are subject to
service charges while those living in estates that have been taken
in charge by a local authority are not.
viii. Passing service charges on to tenants on long-term leases. This
could be facilitated by the RTB. Tenants could have the right to
request proof that service charges are paid and if the landlord fails
to provide this, they could elect to pay them and be approved by
the RTB to have this deducted from their rent.
ix. The RTB or Property Services Regulatory Authority could
consider collecting a small percentage of the budget of all OMCs
to create a national sinking fund which could be accessed by any
OMC in distress, subject to approval from the governing body in
question.
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